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RECENT CASES
Banks and Banking-
REQUIREMENT OF PRESENTATION OF PASSBOOK
BEFORE WITHDRAWAL FROM JOINT ACCOUNT
In November, 1946, husband anat wife opened a joint savings account
by depositing $2,000, their signature card stating that they agreed to abide
by the rules of the bank and that the account belonged to them as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. An "Important Notice" printed on the
passbook and one of the bank rules stated that no payments would be made
unless the withdrawing order were accompanied by the passbook.:' Dur-
ing the following year, the husband made ten withdrawals totalling $1,600
without presenting the passbook. In November, 1947, the wife appeared
with the book and withdrew the money remaining in the account, at which
time the bank entered in her book the amounts which her husband had
withdrawn. Almost four years later she sued the bank for these sums.
On appeal from a judgment for the wife the superior court reversed, two
judges holding that the bank was a debtor and that the husband and wife
were joint obligees, payment to one spouse thus satisfying the debt to both.
One judge concurred on the ground that the wife's delay in, objecting
constituted proof of an "account stated" and prevented her from bringing
suit thereafter.2 Forbes v. First Camden National Bank, 95 A.2d 416
(N.J. Super. 1953).
The three states which have previously considered the bank's liability
in this situation have disagreed. Maryland3 and Vermont 4 have held
against the bank on the grounds that the statement on the passbook is a
1. Among the list of rules was: "7. Withdrawal of all or part of a savings deposit
may be made upon presentation of the passbook and the signing of a withdrawal
receipt." Below the list of rules was printed:
"IMPORTANT NOTICE
NO PAYMENTS WILL BE MADE UNLESS THE CHECK OR ORDER THEREOF
IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE PASSBOOK OF THE WITHDRAWING DEPOSITOR."
2. The concurring opinion, by Judge Jayne, was based on the doctrine that if
there is a discrepancy in the account which the bank renders a depositor, the latter
must notify the bank within a reasonable time or the account becomes "stated" and
the depositor loses his action against the bank. Pannonia B. & L. Ass'n v. West Side
Trust Co., 93 N.J.L. 377, 108 Atl. 240 (1919). This doctrine was also recognized
by the majority's opinion, but was less emphasized than the joint obligee rationale.
The period during which a depositor must sue the bank or lose his cause of action
may be determined by referring to statutes covering analogous situations. For example,
thirty-three states have adopted statutes requiring some sort of action within a specified
period on the part of the depositor when his signature has been forged as a drawer.
BEUTEL, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK 32 (1939). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 4-406 (maximum period of grace of three years for reporting any unauthorized
signature or alteration).
3. Mercantile Savings Bank v. Appler, 151 Md. 571, 135 Atl. 373 (1926) (hus-
band falsely represented that he had lost the passbook and the bank issued him a new
one without consulting the wife).
4. Davis v. Chittenden County Trust Co., 115 Vt. 349, 61 A2d 553 (1948) (wife
actually warned the bank to require the book, and an officer assured her that the bank
would do so).
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provision of the contract among the bank, the husband and the wife which
was not intended to benefit the bank alone, and which the bank may not
waive. Probably the rationale behind this rule is that a printed contract,
if ambiguous, should be construed against the draftsman 5 and that a provi-
sion in a contract should not be held solely for the benefit of one party
unless this was clearly the intention of all parties. These opinions
especially stress the fact that the "no .payment without passbook" provision
tends to lead the wife to rely on it in order to control withdrawals. New
York, on the other hand, has held for the bank, apparently on the ground
that a bank by-law which allowed it to waive the production of the passbook
in certain cases also applied to joint deposits.6
The instant case is an innovation in holding for the bank on the basis
of the joint obligee theory. The Restatement of Contracts provides that
any joint obligee has the power to discharge the promisor from his obliga-
tion to both joint obligees by receipt of the performance promised, or by
release or otherwise; but, a discharge of the promisor by an obligee in fraud
of his co-obligee is inoperative to discharge the promisor's duty to the
extent of the co-obligee's interest in the performance, if the promisor knows
or has reason to know of the fraud.7 The present court said that the hus-
band and wife as depositors were joint creditors and the bank was their
debtor, 8 and that the "power of the husband as a joint obligee to release
the debt included the minor power to waive production of the passbook." 9
All of the decisions on the joint deposit problem, including the instant
one, agree that the statements on the passbook, if assented to by the de-
positors, are part of the provisions of the contract among the bank and the
depositors. The express terms of such a contract should control the rights
of all parties to it and thereby foreclose the application of the rule on dis-
charge by a joint obligee. Since the passbook agreement provides for the
payment to a co-obligee only on a particular condition-presentation of the
book-payment without the book is a breach of this contract. The bank
should thus be liable as if it had paid to any other unauthorized with-
drawer. 10 Moreover, although an admittedly valid co-creditor's release
5. The court in the instant case recognized this rule, but only to the extent of
stating that the passbook provision was intended to benefit "both parties" by assuring
the depositors that if they were careful not to lose the passbook, their money would
remain safe in the account. Forbes v. First Camden National Bank, 95 A.2d 416, 419
(N.J. Super. 1953).
6. Brooks v. Erie County Savings Bank, 159 App. Div. 73, 154 N.Y. Supp. 692
(4th Dep't 1915), off'd, 224 N.Y. 639, 121 N.E. 857 (1918). Such a by-law did not
exist in the instant case.
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 130-131 (1932).
8. The relationship between a bank and a depositor is often said to be that of
debtor and creditor. See New York County Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 145
(1904) ; Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 224, 63 N.E. 969, 970 (1902);
Knoll v. Commercial Trust Co., 249 Pa. 197, 199, 94 At. 750, 751 (1915).
9. Instant case at 419.
10. See, e.g., Ficken v. Emmigrants' Industrial Savings Bank, 33 N.Y. Misc. 92,
67 N.Y. Supp. 143 (Sup. Ct. 1900). In Twibell v. London Suburban Bank, [1869]
W.N. 127, plaintiff and his partner agreed with the bank that the bank was not to pay
checks to either partner unless the absent partner had initialed the check sought to be
cashed by the drawer. The bank paid the partner without requiring the plaintiff's
initials and was held liable to plaintiff for a moiety of the withdrawn amount because
of its breach of contract.
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of a debtor harms the absent, unassenting co-creditor fully as much as the
waiver of the passbook provision in the instant case, the usual case of a
co-creditor's release, as apparently contemplated by the Restatenwnt, is
where one partner releases a person who is indebted to the partnership
without any contract as to the method of payment.I Such a release
normally does not benefit one partner at the expense of the other. Indeed,
if the consideration which the debtor gives the co-creditor in return for
the release obviously inures solely to the benefit of the releasing co-creditor,
it will be considered fraudulent and will not discharge the debtor from
his obligation to the non-releasing creditor.'2  It might also be argued that
the bank's act of payment without the book is fraudulent, since it knows that
the husband is breaking the agreement and is thereby warned that he
intends to defraud the wife.' 3 Although because of the lapse of time in
bringing the instant suit the result seems proper,' 4 the court's utilization of
the joint obligee theory appears unfortunate since it weakens a means of
control on which joint depositors may often rely.15
Constitutional Law-
TRANSPORTATION OF COMMODITY AT A LOSS HELD
NOT CONFISCATORY UNDER FIFTH AMENDMENT
Pursuant to Section 15(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act' the ICC
prescribed maximum carload rates for carrying certain kinds of fresh
vegetables. The railroads affected thereby brought an action in the district
11. Of eighteen cases listed in the Annotations of five states to the Restatement
of Contracts under § 130, the joint obligees were expressly noted as partners in six
cases; in one they were members of a joint stock company; in four, they were
associated in business although not expressly designated as partners by the opinion;
in six, joint owners of land, and in only one, Miller v. Stanley, 186 Ill. App. 340
(1914), was there no business connection at all between the joint obligees. RESTATE-
mENT, CONTRACTS, ANNO. § 130, ILL. (1936); MAss. (1935); N.H. (1936); N.Y.
(1933) ; PA. (1933). But Williston cited his own treatise as support for § 130,
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 127 (now § 130) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1925), and one of
the cases cited in the treatise implicitly rejected the idea that there had to be a busi-
ness relationship between the joint obligees. Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. & W. 264, 151
Eng. Rep. 765 (1840). In the other eleven cases cited, however, there was such a
relationship. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 343 (1924).
12. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 802 (1951). It was so held where a partner attempted
to discharge the debt owed the partnership by setting off his own personal debt to
the obligor. Chase v. Buhl Iron Works, 55 Mich. 139, 20 N.W. 827 (1884).
13. See text at note 7 supra.
14. See note 2 supra.
15. This would be especially true if the theory of the instant case were followed
in the minority of states which allow the joint account to be used for testamentary
purposes. See Kehl v. Omaha National Bank, 126 Neb. 695, 254 N.W. 397 (1934) ;
Andrew v. Citizens' State Bank, 205 Iowa 237, 216 N.W. 12 (1927) ; People's State
Bank v. Miller's Estate, 198 Mich. 783, 165 N.W. 608 (1917). The reasoning in the
instant case would allow the intended beneficiary to withdraw the funds if he dis-
covers the existence of the account even though the depositor retained possession
of the passbook. This problem cannot arise in New Jersey, however, since it is there
held that there is no effective gift under these circumstances. Schippers v. Kempkes,
67 Atl. 1042 (N.J. Ch. 1907), aff'd, 72 N.J. Eq. 948, 73 AtI. 1118 (1909).
1. 34 STAT. 589 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1946).
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court to set aside the Commission's rate order, contending that since the
prescribed rates would produce less money than it would cost them to carry
the particular commodities, the rates were confiscatory and in violation of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 2 The district court dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that despite the fact that the rates
were non-compensatory, they were nevertheless valid. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. United States, 73 Sup. Ct. 592 (1953).
The power of the ICC to prescribe railroad rates is limited by the
Fifth Amendment, which has been interpreted to require that rates must be
fair and reasonable in order to avoid the charge of confiscation.3 The
minimum criterion of reasonableness for a carrier in the normal situation 4
has been that it receive some profit or net income.5 In the instant case,
however, the Court decided that carrying a commodity at a loss did not
result in confiscation. The decision was based on two grounds: first, that a
non-compensatory rate on a particular commodity is not confiscatory so
long as it does not result in a loss on over-all services; second, that earlier
cases allowed non-compensatory rates to stand so long as they were other-
wise reasonable."
The first proposition is in direct conflict with the case of Northern
Pacific R.R. v. North Dakota.7  There the rates on shipping coal were
challenged as being confiscatory because they resulted in a loss to the car-
rier. In upholding this contention the Court enunciated the principle that
an over-all profit was not determinative of the reasonableness of a particular
rate.8 The proper test, said the Court, was that a revenue must result from
all the services to which the rate is applicable. 9 As to the second conten-
tion that there is a standard of reasonableness whereby a non-compensatory
rate can still be constitutionally valid, the Court cites the Northern Pacific
case as authority.10 However, that case merely admits the possibility that
2. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "No person shall . . . be deprived
of . . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
3. Missouri, K. & T. R.R. v. ICC, 164 Fed. 645 (E.D. Mo. 1908); cf. Denver
Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470 (1938).
4. In the case of New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 338 (1947) the
Court said: "Certainly rates need not compensate carriers for the most expensive way
of handling . . . service." In cases where management is inefficient, the road has
been unwisely built, there is not sufficient business to sustain a road, or unwise con-
tracts have been entered into with other carriers, the lack of profit is not the proper
criterion of the reasonableness of the rate. See, e.g., Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S.
564 (1917).
5. Northern Pacific R.R. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915) ; Chicago M. &
St. P. Ry. v. Public Utilities Commission, 274 U.S. 344 (1927); see Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 313 (1935).
6. Instant case at 594.
7. 236 U.S. 585 (1915) ; accord, Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413 (1925);
Vandalia R.R. v. Schnull, 255 U.S. 113 (1921).
8. Northern Pacific R.t. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 596, 603 (1915).
9. Id. at 600, 604.
10. Instant case at 594.
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there might be such a standard 11 and subsequent Supreme Court decisions
applying Northern Pacific do not even allude to this possible standard. 12
More important, even assuming this standard to exist, the Court in
Northern Pacific implied that compelling reasons must exist in order to
meet the standard and validate the rate in the face of a finding that it results
in a loss to the carrier.
18
In the instant case the Court gives two bases for its finding of reason-
ableness: that this is a difficult area involving conflicting claims and
numerous factors which the Commission has carefully considered; 14 and
that the public interest justifies the result.15 As to the former contention,
while careful Commission consideration in a difficult area is a sufficient
reason to establish the original presumption in favor of the reasonableness
of the rate; 16 when that presumption is rebutted, under the Northern
Pacific doctrine, by a finding that the rates result in a loss to the carrier,1'
it is illogical to say the same reason can again be set forth to justify the
Commission's order. As to the Court's other proposition, railroads have
never been required to carry commodities at a loss on the basis of public
interest.'8 It can be argued that since railroads are required to maintain
particular facilities such as spur lines, through passenger service, or pull-
man service at a loss on the basis of public interest,19 that same interest
should allow the transportation of particular commodities at a loss. How-
ever, the public need is more proximate and compelling in relation to facili-
ties than it is in relation to shipping commercial products. Maintaining
11. Northern Pacific R.R. v. North Dakota, supra note 8 at 599. The Court says:
"If in such a case there exists any practice, or what ma be taken to be (broadly
speaking) a standard of rates with respect to that traffic, in the light of which it is
insisted that the rate should still be regarded as reasonable [after having been found
to be non-compensatory], that should be made to appear." (Italics supplied) This is
the only reference the Court makes to the possibility of such a standard. The re-
mainder of the opinion speaks strongly in terms of the rate's not being reasonable
if not compensatory.
12. In Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413, 421 (1925) the Court said: "The
State is without power to require the traffic covered by the fare enjoined to be carried
at a loss or without substantial compensation over its proper cost." Again in Vandalia
R.R. v. Schnull, 255 U.S. 113, 120 (1921), the controlling language of the Northern
Pacific case was cited as being: ". . . where there is . . . a rate imposed which
would compel the carrier to transport a commodity 'for less than the proper cost of
transportation, or virtually at cost' the carrier would be 'denied a reasonable reward
for its service,' and 'the State has exceeded its authority.'"
13. Northern Pacific R.R. v. North Dakota, supa note 8 at 597, 599 and compdre
p. 604. Compare also Mr. justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in the instant case at
595. Until the instant case, sufficiently compelling reasons have never been found to
exist.
14. Instant case at 594.
15. Ibid.
16. Northern Pacific R.R. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 604 (1915).
17. Id. at 599.
18. Id. at 595. "As a carrier for hire, it [a railroad] cannot be compelled to
carry persons or goods gratuitously. The case would not be altered by the assertion
that the public interest demanded such carriage." See also id. at 598; cases cited
note 7 supra.
19. E.g., Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U.S. 574 (1917).
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facilities insures transportation to the public, while regulating rates on
commercial commodities only affects the public by reducing costs and, in
turn, prices. But the public benefit provided is questionable since other
rates, costs and ultimately prices must go up as the burden of loss is
shifted.2 0  Moreover, even in the area of facilities and services the same
constitutional test applies. Profits must exist when all the services to
which a rate applied are balanced against it.21
The Court in the instant case adopts the philosophy that the only con-
stitutional guarantee which should be granted to a public carrier is an
over-all profit.2 Under this philosophy individual rates on commodities
can be freely adjusted in order to promote commercial activities in certain
areas where the need is apparent, while the burden of this artificial stimulus
is shifted to areas which can afford to bear the increased expense. How-
ever, there are at least two difficulties presented by this result. First, it
envisages the ICC as a central economic policy-making body granting
subsidies, when despite its broad powers the Commission has hitherto been
considered essentially regulatory for transportation purposes alone.p If
there is to be a shift in the purpose of the ICC it should stem from the legis-
lature rather than from the judiciary. Second, if promotion of com-
mercial activities becomes the dominant factor in determining the reason-
ableness of a rate structure, the result may be discrimination among ship-
pers of different commodities. Another result may be a further step toward
lessening even the over-all profit of the carriers, and in addition, this
philosophy would tend to keep the rate structure in a greater state of flux,
thus preventing stability in rate relationships 2 4 However, despite the rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages of the court's philosophy, since the instant
decision negatives concepts and precedents of long standing,25 the Court
should not have effectuated this policy in the absence of a more compelling
present need than was shown in this case 26
20. Northern Pacific R.R. v. North Dakota, supra note 8 at 598.
21. Id. at 600. Cf. Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413 (1925). Under this
uniform rule, a loss on a spur line is not analogous to a loss on a commodity. In the
case of a spur line this represents only a portion of the service to which the passenger
rate is applicable. The same rate is applicable to the main line. Therefore a profit
must result when the services on both lines are balanced against the uniform rate
which applies to both. However, since an individual rate applies to a commodity, all
the service applicable to that rate is that which arises in shipping the commodity;
therefore, a profit must exist when the rate is balanced against the distinct services
involved in shipping the commodity. The only analogy which can be drawn between
a spur line and a commodity is that loss on a spur line is similar to a loss on a par-
ticular shipment of goods, which is not the problem of the instant case.
22. Instant case at 594. This philosophy had been expressed in several instances
prior to the Northern Pacific case which adopted the contrary philosophy. E.g.,
Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361 (1898) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Florida, 203 U.S. 261
(1906).
23. See 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1-10 (1931).
See also 54 STAT. 899 (1940) and introductory note to 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
24. See 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 196 et seq. (1931).
25. See text at note 8 supra.
26. Compare instant case at 594.
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Sales-
DEDUCTION OF USE VALUE FROM PURCHASE PRICE
ON RESCISSION FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
A used car dealer sold for $3,195 an automobile which unknown to him
was stolen property. Seven months after the sale when the automobile
had been used over 5000 miles, it was seized from the purchaser's pos-
session by the owner, an insurance company, which had paid the original
owner $2,400 for the loss from theft. The dealer then paid the insurance
company $2,401 for which he received the automobile and an assignment of
all of the company's rights to the vehicle. Three days later the dealer
tendered back the car to his buyer who refused to accept it and instead
brought suit against the dealer to recover his purchase price. After the
buyer's rejection of the automobile, the dealer realized $2,300 on resale,
the amount to which he claims the buyer is entitled. In a clarification
opinion,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the award of the full
purchase price to the buyer under the Uniform Sales Act,2 basing its holding
upon the fact that the dealer had failed to prove any actual loss to him from
the buyer's use. Park Circle Motor Co. v. Willis, 94 A.2d 443 (Md. 1953).
The Uniform Sales Act permits a buyer of goods to rescind a sale for
breach of warranty of title and recover the price paid or to refuse to accept
the goods and sue for damages.3 Four alternative remedies are provided
by the Act for relief from other breaches of warranty, but only rescission
or damages is available to one who has surrendered possession to the true
owner.4 The purpose of rescission is to return the parties to their status
at the time of the contract. 5 If the buyer is unable to put his seller in his
previous status quo because the property has become considerably les-
sened in value by virtue of damage or destruction, there is no right of
rescission; 1 but, rescission for breach of warranty of title with recovery of
the full purchase price has been allowed, although the buyer had used the
1. The original opinion appears in 92 A.2d 757 (Md. 1952), where the court
intimates that the value of the property at the time of seizure is the proper measure
of recovery, based on the authority of Myers v. Smith & Barrick, 27 Md. 91 (1869).
2. "Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may at his
election-
"(d) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale and . .. if the goods have already
been received, return them or offer to return them to the seller and recover
the price, or any part thereof, which has been paid." UNI-oaa SALES Acr
§69(1) (d) ; 3 MD. CoDE ANN. art. 83, §87(1) (d) (1951).
3. For a discussion of rescission for breach of warranty in general, see Williston,
Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 16 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1903).
4. See note 2 supra. Courts have usually held these alternatives mutually exclu-
sive. Hamlin Machine Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 78 A.2d 450 (1951) ; Note, 33 MINN.
L. REv. 406 (1949). But sometimes damages are allowed on rescission in addition to
the purchase price in order to compensate fully for the loss resulting from breach.
E.g., Riggs Motor Co. v. Archer, 240 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1951) ; 2 WILLISTON, SALES
§ 615a (2d ed. 1924) ; Zelermyer, Rescission and Damages for Breach of Warranty,
2 SYRACusE L. Rzv. 82 (1950).
5. Garbarck v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d 315 (1952).
6. Burnley v. Shinn, 80 Wash. 240, 141 Pac. 326 (1914).
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property for some time before seizure.7 The latter proposition, however,
has not been literally followed, for in breach of warranty of title situations
recovery of the fuli purchase price has not been granted when there was
no surrender of possession by the buyer,8 or there was use for a number of
years before seizure.9 Cases permitting deduction from the purchase price
have, however, usually involved a breach of warranty of quality after which
the goods were returned to the seller in a damaged condition. 10
At the time of the sale in the instant case the seller had no title to pass
but warranted that the buyer would enjoy undisturbed possession. When
the automobile was seized, the consideration failed 11 and the buyer's right
of rescission immediately accrued. Since the seller had become titleholder
of an automobile depreciated by seven months' use, he claimed that he had
lost the difference between his sale price of seven months ago and his
present resale price. Apparently seller's theory was that he was entitled
to have damages diminished by cost of the seven months use; that the
difference in market values at sale and seizure was determinative of this cost;
and that his two sale prices properly reflected market values. If the desire
is to return the parties to their status quo, reduction in damages to the
extent of use should be allowed. The difficulty, however, is in computing
a reasonable cost of use. If there has been no great market decline, the
differential in market values would seem to be attributable to the value of
the use. But in the instant case the subsequent sale price of the seller
indicates a decline in the market.' 2 The burden of this decline should be
on the seller because he is in the better position to bear the risk from sales
of stolen property.'3 It is not unlikely that had the seller asked the court
to reduce the buyer's recovery by some figure fixed by the court as repre-
senting reasonable cost of use for seven months, the buyer would not have
7. Argens v. Whitcomb, 20 Wash.2d 371, 147 P.2d 501 (1944). In other cases
where return of the full purchase price was allowed, there was apparently no question
of deduction for use raised by the seller although there had been use for a number
of months before seizure. Riggs Motor Co. v. Archer, 240 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1951)
(seven months) ; Forrest v. Watts & Behrnes, 47 So.2d 112 (La. 1950) (five
months) ; Neosho Motor Corp. v. Patterson, 184 Okla. 540, 88 P.2d 632 (1939)
(nine months); Peregrine v. West Seattle State Bank, 120 Wash. 653, 208 Pac.
35 (1922) (46 days). See also 5 WILLISTON, CoNTacTs § 1463 n.2 (Rev. ed. 1937).
8. Burt v. Dewey, 40 N.Y. 283 (1869).
9. Peel v. Villac, 3 La. App. 447 (1926). In one case the court held that the
buyer was entitled to the value of the goods at the time of loss of possession since
the property had appreciated in value as a result of economic conditions. Pillgrene
v. Paulman, 71 A.2d 59 (Del. 1950).
10. See, e.g., Ross v. Riedley Motor Co., 275 Ky. 302, 121 S.W.2d 689 (1938);
Burnley v. Shinn, 80 Wash. 240, 141 Pac. 326 (1914).
11. Neosho Motor Corp. v. Patterson, 184 Okla. 540, 88 P.2d 632 (1939). See
also 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 615 (2d ed. 1924).
12. It is extremely unlikely that an automobile sold for $3,195 would decline to a
value of only $2,300 in seven months simply from use for 5000 miles.
13. Moreover, as between seller and buyer the former is the primary wrongdoer
in a breach of warranty situation; it would hardly return the buyer to the status
quo of the initial sale were he to have the burden of market decline. Some other
method of computation would also have to be devised in a rising market, were the
unlikely eventuality of a rescission to occur there. Cf. note 9 mtpra.
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recovered the full purchase price.14 A buyer who uses an automobile for
seven months should not be enriched to the extent of that use if its monetary
value can be determined. This is especially clear where, as here, the seller
in tendering back the automobile three days after its seizure manifested
an honest desire to obviate any disturbance of the buyer's possession. This
should be as much of a factor in allowing a deduction as extensive damage
or use for several years by the buyer before seizure. Only by restoring to
the seller compensation for the use value at a reasonable figure, can equity
truly put the seller in his status quo before the original sale.
Under the proposed Uniform Commercial Code'15 a buyer can revoke
his acceptance 16 of goods tendered under a contract of sale. This remedy
would doubtless be available to a buyer in a breach of warranty of title
situation, since the remedy is available where the non-conformity 17 sub-
stantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer.'8 But the Code alters
the language of the Uniform Sales Act 19 by requiring that any substantial
change in the condition of the goods not caused by their own defects pre-
vents the buyer from revoking his acceptance ° Perhaps it is sufficient that
an automobile is subject to the defect of being depreciable through use, but
if that is not the type of "defect" contemplated by the Code, one essential
clement for a buyer's revocation of acceptance would be lacking. The Code
also permits a seller to cure delivery of non-conforming goods within a
14. See Argens v. Whitcomb, 20 Wash.2d 371, 377, 147 P.2d 501, 504 (1944),
where the court was impressed by the fact that there was not ". . . a word of evi-
dence in the record as to the value of the use." There the primary basis of the holding
denying deduction for use value was that the seller, not being the owner of the car,
had no right to its possession and thus no right to its use value. This reasoning would
not apply in the instant case where the seller had later acquired all rights of the
owner. Allowing a deduction in this situation would encourage sellers to repurchase
cars which often will have come into the hands of an insurance company as in the
instant case.
Possible methods of computing a reasonable cost of use are: (1) utilize the cost
figures of an automobile rental agency within the same geographical area; and (2)
diminish the difference in market value by the amount of the market decline as
reflected in trade indices. It must be kept in mind, however, that these proof problems
will largely depend on the individual case.
15. UNIFORMs COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608. For a general criticism of the Code see
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv.
L. REv. 561 (1950).
16. The ambiguous term "rescission" has been replaced by "revocation of ac-
ceptance." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608, comment 1.
17. Section 2-608 apparently applies to a breach of warranty of title. "Goods or
conduct including any part of a performance are 'conforming' or conform to the con-
tract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(2).
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-608(1).
19. Under the Uniform Sales Act the goods must be "in substantially as good
condition as they were in at the time the property was transferred to the buyer" for
a rescission to be possible. "But if deterioration or injury of the goods is due to the
breach of warranty, such deterioration or injury shall not prevent the buyer from
returning or offering to return the goods to the seller and rescinding the sale."
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 69(3).
20. "Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change
in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608(2).
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reasonable time; 21 but, since that section is for the protection of sellers
from surprise rejection at the time of delivery,2 it is inapplicable to the
present situation where rescission or revocation of acceptance occurred
seven months after delivery.2 The Code, therefore, does not make any
definitive statements applicable to the present situation; but leaves the
question of deduction for use, granting the requirements for a rescission are
met, in its present fluid and unhappy state.
Taxation-
ASSIGNED LIFE INSURANCE PURCHASED WITH
ANNUITY HELD NOT TAXABLE TO ESTATE
Decedent, aged 62, purchased on her own life, simultaneously and
without medical examination, a single premium annuity, which cost $23,000
and returned $1,600 annually, and a single premium life insurance contract,
which cost $54,000 and had a face value of $72,000. Neither policy referred
to or was calculated with regard to the other, but the life policy would
not have been sold without the annuity. Decedent, upon purchase, assigned
to her children, plaintiffs, all rights to the life insurance policy, including the
right to surrender it for cash, and the following year she filed a gift tax
return for the assignment. When decedent died, in June 1942, the Com-
missioner collected the estate tax I on the proceeds of the life insurance,
as a transfer under which decedent had retained for her life the right to
the income from the property.2 Plaintiffs contested the Commissioner's
determination and sued for a refund, which the district court granted.
The circuit court affirmed, holding that although such a combination was
like a single investment program and therefore no part was taxable as
21. UNIFOR11! COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508(2).
22. Id. at comment 2.
23. Had the substitution been offered within the contract time for performance,
the Code would treat the breach as cured. Id. at § 2-508(1).
1. Credit toward the estate tax was allowed for payment of the gift tax.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.8 (1942).
2. The section of the statute in effect at decedent's death read:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value . . . of all property . . .
"To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer . . .intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death . . .or . . .under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact
end before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property . . ." Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), 44 STAT. 70 (1926), as
amended by 47 STAT. 279 (1932).
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insurance under § 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926,3 the assignment had
divested decedent's estate during her lifetime of all interests in the life
insurance policy. Therefore the value of the policy was taxable neither as
a transfer under which she retained for life the right to the income from
the property 4 nor as a transfer intended to take effect in possession at or
after her death.5 The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam by an equally
divided court. Bohnen v. Harrison, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3285 (U.S. May 5,
1953).
Since life insurance companies classify the aged as uninsurable risks,
these people, in order to obtain insurance, are compelled by the companies
to purchase annuity policies to counterbalance the risks involved in life
insurance." When aged persons sought by this combination of policies to
obtain the advantages of the $40,000 estate tax exemption on insurance
which existed prior to October 1942, 7 the Supreme Court in Helvering v.
Le Gierse 8 held that the proceeds of the life insurance policy were not
"insurance" under § 302(g) because the essential elements of risk-shifting
and risk-distributing were absent; the two contracts were one transaction
and therefore the proceeds payable to the beneficiary were taxable as a
transfer to take effect after death. At the same time, encouraged perhaps
by a Treasury policy of assessing life policies according to the incidents of
ownership test,9 taxpayers sought to avoid both § 302(g) and the taking
effect after death provision by assigning all rights to the life insurance,
including cash surrender privileges, to third parties. The tax court I' held
this arrangement nevertheless to take effect after death, while the second"
3. The section of the statute in effect at decedent's death read:
"The value of the gross estate . . . shall be determined by including the value
. . . of all property....
"To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies
taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the excess over
$40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies
taken out by the decedent upon his own life." Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(g), 44 STAT.
70 (1926).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Ibid.
6. The companies' risk in a life insurance policy is that insured will die before his
actuarially predicted death; the risk in an annuity is that insured will live too long.
If insured dies early, the amount gained by the company on the annuity compensates
for the loss to the company on the life insurance. If insured lives too long, the gain
on the life insurance compensates for the loss on the annuity. When the price of the
combination equals the face value of a life insurance policy plus loading charges, the
risks are balanced and destroyed. In reality then, the annuity payments consist only
of interest on the price paid less loading charges.
7. The exemption was removed by the Revenue Act of 1942, §404(g), 56 STAT.
798 (1942), INT. REV. CODE § 811 (g).
8. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
9. Until the passage of the 1942 Act the Treasury, in taxing life insurance to
decedents' estates, vacillated between the tests of requiring decedent to have paid the
premiums on a policy and requiring some incidents of ownership. The latter test
excludes irrevocably assigned insurance. See 1 PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GwTr
TAXATION 511 (1942).
10. Estate of Cora C. Reynolds, 45 B.T.A. 44 (1941).
11. Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946).
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and sixth circuits 12 held it to be taxable as a transfer with a life estate
retained.13 When the instant case arose, however, both the district court 14
and the seventh circuit 15 rejected the earlier holdings that Le Gierse re-
quired taxation by distinguishing it as not dealing with an assigned policy.
Although the Supreme Court has affirmed the instant decision per
curiam by an equally divided court despite the disagreement of two cir-
cuits, since the affirmance was of such an insubstantial nature and since
the Code has been amended subsequent to decedent's death,16 the Com-
missioner may not acquiesce and courts may distinguish future cases. Taxa-
tion will probably depend on interpretation of three sections of the Code:
(1) § 81 1(g) (2), assigned insurance purchased with premiums paid by
decedent; 17 (2) § 811 (c) (1) (B), a transfer with right to the income from
the property retained for life; 18 (3) § 811 (c) (3), a transfer after October
7, 1949 to take effect in possession at or after death.19
12. Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1952).
13. See note 2 supra.
14. Bohnen v. Harrison, 100 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
15. Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952).
16. The Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(g), 56 STAT. 798 (1942), INT. REV. CODE
§ 811 (g) (2) now requires taxation of insurance proceeds, "To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of
decedent (A) purchased with premiums . . . paid directly or indirectly by the
decedent . . . or (B) with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any
of the incidents of ownership . . ."
As a result of the Public Law of Oct. 25, 1949, § 7(a), 63 STAT. 894, the taking
effect at death clause of INT. REV. CODE § 811(c) was amended to read:
"The value of the gross estate . . . shall be determined by including the value
• . . of all property ...
(1) . . . To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer ...
(C) intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death.
(2) Transfers Taking Effect at Death-Transfers Prior to October 7,
1949. . . . [express reversionary interest required].
(3) Transfers Taking Effect at Death-Transfers After October 7, 1949.-
An interest in property transferred by the decedent after October 7, 1949, shall
be included in his gross estate under paragraph (1) (C) of this subsection
(whether or not the decedent retained any right or interest in the property trans-
ferred) if and only if-
(A) possession or enjoyment . . . can, through ownership of such
interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent; or
(B) under alternative contingencies provided by the terms of the transfer,
possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of such
interest, be obtained only by surviving the earlier to occur of (i) the decedent's
death or (ii) some other event; and such other event did not in fact occur
during the decedent's life.
"Notwithstanding the foregoing sentence, an interest so transferred shall not be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate under paragraph (1) (C) of this subsection if
possession or enjoyment of the property could have been obtained by any beneficiary
during the decedent's life through the exercise of a power of appointment . . .
which in fact was exercisable immediately prior to the decedent's death."
17. See note 16 supra.
18. Essentially unchanged from § 302(c), note 2 supra.
19. See note 16 supra,
1953]
1238 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
Combination annuity and life insurance policies, despite the fact that
the premiums and reserves are calculated separately,20 are the equivalent
of a safe investment in stocks or bonds.21  Since the total premium on the
two policies always approximates the face value of the life insurance 
22
(exceeding it to the extent of the company loading charges, 6% to 10%0 23),
the annual return on the annuity represents a small guaranteed interest on
the face value.24 The face value itself is returned at decedent's death. Not
only does the company assume no risk 25 but the insured shifts none to any-
one else; since he already has sufficient money to equal the face value of the
life insurance, 26 his death without the combination of policies would en-
danger the financial security of his beneficiary no more than with it. As-
signing irrevocably the life policy does not create a risk either to the
company or beneficiary (probably the assignee); the company still has
the same reserves while the beneficiary is provided for as before. The
courts have been in agreement that for these reasons the life policy is not
taxable as insurance; 27 but, it has been suggested that since the $40,000
insurance exemption has been repealed, Le Gierse could be overruled with-
out harmful effect 28
Similarly, mere assignment of the life policy does not change the
unitary nature of the investment to the decedent or the company; and, there-
fore, the policy should be taxable under § 811 (c) (2) (B) as a transfer with
a right to the income from the property reserved.29  Although the seventh
circuit held that the mere unexercised ability of the assignee to cash in the
policy was sufficient control to destroy decedent's interest in the property,
that control does not separate the counterbalancing annuity and insurance
reserves 3 0 nor does it remove decident's right to the income, as it would if
20. See Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts Under Estate and In-
heritance Taxes, 39 MIcH. L. REv. 856, 883 (1941).
21. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941); Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d
965 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Commis-
sioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Estate of Cora C. Reynolds, 45 B.T.A.
44 (1941).
22. The fact that the total of the two premiums must equal the face value of the
life insurance is necessary to balance the risks; for instance, if insured died immediately
after purchase, the whole amount of the annuity premium would be necessary (in addi-
tion to the life insurance premium) to pay the face value of the life insurance because
premature death had deprived the company of any opportunity to invest the life
insurance premium.
23. Compare figures in Note, 62 YALn L.J. 822 n.2 (1953), with figure of 6%
in instant case.
24. See Meisenholder, supra note 20, at 884.
25. See note 6 supra.
26. See text at note 22 supra.
27. Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952); Conway v. Glenn, 193
F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946).
28. See Note, 62 YALE L.J. 822 (1953).
29. INT. REv. CODE §811(c) (1) (B).
30. See Note, 62 YALE L.J. 822 (1953), which suggests that the life insurance
proceeds in the instant case should have been taxed only to the extent that they
exceed the cash surrender value immediately before death, since that difference is the
real amount realized through death. See Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance: A Sug-
gested Solution to the Uncertain Cost of Dying, 55 HARv. L. Rxv. 226 (1941). Since
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assignee owned the annuity also.31 It is true that the insurance company has
an obligation to pay the annuity whatever happens to the reserves,32 but in
these commercial transactions the income is so calculated as to be interest
on the property invested, which remains intact until cash surrender.33
Furthermore, since assignment of an insurance policy paid for by a decedent
is not sufficient divestment of control to render it untaxable to his estate as
insurance under § 811(g) (2) 34 a similar assignment here should have no
different effect even though the policy is not taxable as insurance. Transfer
of property at death is the incident which the Code seeks to tax.35 It is
only when and if 36 the assignee does surrender the policy that the income
is no longer from the property which decedent originally invested, and the
analogy to an ordinary remainder after a life estate is destroyed. The
annuity must be paid from its own invested reserve, and the surrendered
life policy is completely dissociated from the annuity payments. There is
left no significant difference from the untaxable situation where A transfers
property absolutely to B in consideration that B support 8 7 or employ A.38
Thus after, but only after, surrender there is not only no transferred prop-
erty in which decedent has retained a life estate but also assignee has ob-
tained absolute possession before death.
A third possibility is taxation under § 811(c) (3) as a transfer of an
interest in property to take effect at death where "possession . . . can
. be obtained only by surviving the earlier to occur of (i) the dece-
dent's death or (ii) some other event; and such event did not in fact
occur. .. ." The life policy is a transfer which takes effect at death 39
and the "other event" which does not occur would seem to cover assignees'
power to cash in the life policy; but a proviso states that the section shall
Congress adopted in 1942 the premium payments test (see note 16 supra) for assignedlife insurance in § 811(g) (2), for future cases it would seem that the mere fact thatassignee can cash in a life insurance policy, whether or not it is "insurance" underthe statute, is not a sufficient consideration to prevent the proceeds from being taxed
in assignor's estate.
31. This was the case in Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945), wherethe assignee owned both the annuity and the life insurance. The holding that theinsurance was taxable has been overruled by INT. REv. CoDE § 811(c) (3). H.R. REP.
No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949), Example 6.32. Where the payments are completely unrelated to the transferred property, theproperty is not taxable as a transfer with a life estate retained. Estate of WilliamHofford, 4 T.C. 790 (1945) ; Estate of Sarah Bergan, 1 T.C. 543 (1943) ; see Com-
ment, 5 STAN. L. REv. 545, 557 (1953).
33. The risk of an annuity-that purchaser will live too long-appears for thefirst time when the contracts are really separated by the cash surrender.
34. See note 16 supra.
35. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 322 (1932).
36. It is not likely that assignees will surrender life insurance policies; for thesurrender value is always less than the premium plus interest because the company
subtracts its loading charge.
37. Estate of Sarah Bergan, 1 T.C. 43 (1943). Where it is the income from theproperty which supports A, that is a different and taxable matter. Estate of Cornelia
Schwartz, 9 T.C. 229 (1947).
38. Estate of William Hofford, 4 T.C. 790 (1945). See McClure, Estate andGift Tax Aspects of Intra-Family Annuities, 17 J.B.A. KAN. 397 (1949).
39. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941),
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not apply "if possession . . . of the property could have been obtained
by any beneficiary during decedent's life through the exercise of a power
of appointment. . . ." The House Conference Report 40 indicates that
this provision is to cover the Goldstone 4. situation where the assignee had a
power of appointment over both the annuity and the life policy. Whether
the proviso will give immunity to a power over the life policy alone again
depends on the interpretation of the word property. If the combination is
considered a single unit of property, it would seem taxable as long as pur-
chaser retains the right to the annuity payments and assignee fails to cash
in the policy, since the control over the entire property which Congress
saw in Goldstone is not present, the actual possession or enjoyment does
not occur until death,42 and the proviso presumably refers to the whole
property. On the other hand, if the assigned insurance is considered a
separate "interest in property," the property to which the interest refers
is only the insurance reserve, which is untaxable because it is obtainable
prior to purchaser's death. However, the desirability of uniformity of
treatment with § 811 (g) (2), which taxes assigned insurance,43 the fact that
the proviso was intended to cover a distinguishable situation, and similarity
of this situation to a remainder in other types of property might indicate
taxation under § 811 (c) (3) also. Surrender of the life insurance, however,
would avoid the tax by effectuating the transfer before death.
If the ruling of the Supreme Court is neither changed nor distin-
guished, estate planners may find it useful to invest in combination annuities
and life insurance rather than stocks and bonds. If the total of the gift tax
and the loading charge is less than the estate tax,4 assigning the life insur-
ance in a combination will become a profitable method of making a will.
Taxation-
SPOUSES ALLOWED TO SPLIT BUNCHED INCOME
IN ALLOCATING TO YEARS PRIOR TO § 12(d)
Taxpayer received $134,890.931 in the year 1948 as full compensation
for his share of legal services rendered by his law partnership for the period
from March, 1938 until March, 1945. He and his wife, who were married
prior to 1938, filed a joint return for 1948 under the "split income" provi-
40. H.R. REP., supra note 31. See Bittker, Church and Spiegel: The Legislative
Sequel, 59 YALE L.J. 395, 406 (1950).
41. See note 31 supra.
42. INT. REv. CODE § 811 (c) (1) (C). Cf. Commissioner v. Church, 335 U.S. 632
(1949).
43. See note 30 supra. Absence of risk prevents it from being insurance.
44. Since the gift tax rate is roughly three-quarters of the estate tax rate, the six
to ten percent loading charge will more than destroy any tax advantages until very
large amounts are involved.
1. For ease in computation this figure will be rounded out to $140,000 for all
further references and examples throughout this comment.
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sion of § 12(d),2 in which they reported the amount of the legal fee. They
also invoked the relief provisions of § 107(a) ,3 by prorating the lump sum
over the years in which it had been earned. For those prior years in which
each had filed separate returns, they recomputed their tax as if each had
received one-half of the aliquot portion of the bunched income.4 For those
prior years in which they had filed a joint return, they computed the addi-
tional tax attributable to one-half of the income, and then doubled that
figure. The aggregate of the additional taxes so determined constituted the
maximum tax payable on the bunched income received in 1948.6 The
2. "In the case of a joint return of husband and wife under section 51(b), the
combined normal tax and surtax under section 11 and subsection (b) of this section
shall be twice the combined normal tax and surtax that would be determined if the
net income and the applicable credits against net income provided by section 25 were
reduced by one-half." INT. REv. CODE § 12(d). Note the argument that since the tax
rates of previous years are applied under § 107(a) and since § 12(d) is in the surtax
rate'section of the Code, the intent may have been that taxpayer use § 12(d) only for
those years during which it was in the Code.
3. "If at least 80 per centum of the total compensation for personal services cover-
ing a period of thirty-six calendar months or more (from the beginning to the com-
pletion of such services) is received or accrued in one taxable year by an individual
or a partnership, the tax attributable to any part thereof which is included in the gross
income of any individual shall not be greater than the aggregate of the taxes at-
tributable to such part had it been included in the gross income of such individual
ratably over that part of the period which precedes the date of such receipt or
accrual." INT. REv. CODE § 107(a). (Italics added). Note that if § 12(d) required
an actual splitting of income between spouses, as is the result of community property
laws, then the portion of § 107(a) italicized above would seem to require that each
spouse allocate one-half of the income separately. But since under § 12(d) the entire
$140,000 is considered income of both spouses, then it seems that the lump sum should
be taxed at a uniform rate applicable to the combined income -of the spouses. This was
the method partly used by the taxpayer. See notes 4 and 5 infra.
4. For purposes of illustration throughout this comment, unless otherwise specified,
we will assume that the husband taxpayer (H) received the $140,000 in 1948; that H
had income of $X in each of the years 1938 to 1945; that wife taxpayer (W) had
individual income of $Y in the years 1938 to 1941 inclusive (thus they filed separate
returns for these years), and $00 in 1942 to 1945 inclusive (thus they filed joint returns
for those years). Then for the years in which they filed separate returns, taxpayers
computed the tax liability on the aliquot portion ($20,000) of the bunched income
allocable to those years as if each spouse had earned half of such an amount ($10,000)
separately. Thus, H determined the tax applicable to $X plus $10,000, and subtracted
from that the tax which he actually paid during those years (i.e., the tax on $X).
W computed the tax attributable to $Y plus $10,000, and subtracted from that the tax
she had actually paid in those years (the tax on $Y). For a criticism of this method
of computation see note 22 infra.
5. In these years H had earned $X, but W had earned $00. Thus, the taxpayers
determined the amount of tax they would have paid on their combined income plus
one-half of the allocable portion of the bunched income for that year ($X plus $00 plus
$10,000). From this they subtracted the tax they had actually paid in those years
(the tax on $X plus $00). The resulting figure represents the tax attributable to
one-half of the allocable portion of the lump-sum compensation for that year. They
then doubled this figure to obtain the tax on the entire aliquot share of the bunched
income for the year. For a discussion of the effect of this computation see text at
note 21 infra.
6. The taxpayers computed the relief in the following manner: (1) They com-
puted the tax on the combined income of the spouses for 1948 without including the
lump sum compensation. (2) They computed the tax in 1948 on their income including
the lump sum compensation. (3) They subtracted the tax in (1) from the tax in
(2). This difference represents the tax attributable to the compensation in 1948.
(4) Next they recomputed the tax they would have paid in each of the seven years
during which the services had been rendered, as explained in notes 4 and 5 supra.
(5) They then subtracted the taxes actually paid by the taxpayers for those years
from the aggregate of the figures determined for both H and W for the seven years
as in notes 4 and 5 supra. The actual tax is the lower of the two figures obtained in
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Collector of Internal Revenue disallowed this method, computing a defi-
ciency by treating the entire sum as husband's income for the years in
question. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment 7 for
taxpayers, and approved taxpayers' method of computation. Hofferbert
v. Marshall, 200 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1952).
Section 12(d), the so-called "split income" provision of the Code,
permits married taxpayers in 1948 and succeeding years to apply to their
combined income lower surtax rates than would be applicable to an in-
dividual reporting the same amount of income. The problem in the instant
case arises from the fact that § 12(d) had not yet become part of the Code
in the years over which the lump sum was to be prorated under § 107(a).
Section 107(a) was designed to relieve taxpayers from the heavier burden
caused by the highly progressive nature of the surtax rates, and to adjust
the resultant inequalities between taxpayers who receive irregular lump
sum payments for long term services and those who receive regular pay-
ments reported in installments as earned and received.8 As originally
enacted 9 the section was interpreted to provide relief only for such per-
sons as had rendered the services. 10 The 1942 amendment broadened the
section to include anyone who shares in compensation for personal services
notwithstanding that he took no part in rendering the services. Thus, the
provision was made available to members of partnerships-even if the tax-
payer was not a member of the partnership when the services were ren-
dered "-and, in community property states, to spouses of persons render-
ing the services.12 If'taxpayers in the instant case resided in a community
property state, the 1942 amendment would permit the method of com-
putation for the separate returns approved by the court.' 3 While tax-
steps (3) and (5). See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.107-1 (1951). Note that these
computations do not require the actual reopening of the return for prior years, nor
the amendment of the prior returns. It is simply a method of computing the maximum
amount taxable on the $140,000 received in 1948. If there were any omissions from
the returns in the years over which the § 107(a) income is being allocated, they will
not be corrected in making the § 107(a) computation. However, the adjusted gross
income used as the basis for maximum medical deductions will be increased to account
for the aliquot share of the § 107(a) income, thus reducing the amount deductible for
extraordinary medical expenses in each of those years. Cf. Edward C. Thayer, 12
T.C. 795 (1949). No case has been reported in which the charitable deductions have
been increased for those years, despite the fact that adjusted gross income is altered.
Since the full amount of charitable contributions actually made in those years may
not appear on the face of the return if those contributions exceeded the maximum
allowable deduction, then administrative expediency would seem to prohibit the taking
of evidence concerning those expenditures.
7. Marshall v. Hofferbert, 108 F. Supp. 350 (D. Md. 1952).
8. SEN. RE!'. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939).
9. "In the case of compensation (a) received, for personal service rendered by an
individual in his individual capacity, or as a member of a partnership . . ." 53 STAT.
878 (1939).
10. Ralph G. Lindstrom, 3 T.C. 686 (1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1945).
11. Elder W. Marshall, 14 T.C. 90, aff'd, 185 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1950); Burnham
Enersen, 9 T.C.M. 42 (1950), and Sigvald Nielson, 9 T.C.M. 57 (1950), both aff'd,
187 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1951).
12. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1942).
13. Such was the procedure followed in the Enersen and Nielson cases cited
in note 11 supra. This is because any income from personal services rendered during
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payer's status as of the time of receipt of the bunched income has been con-
sidered the controlling referent in invoking the relief provisions of
§ 107(a),:14 that section does not in terms require such a result for all
purposes. In Elder W. Marshall 15 such a result was dictated by the legis-
lative history of the 1942 amendment,'0 but that case is not ground for a
sweeping generalization which would be applicable to the facts in the
instant case.
Section 12(d), applicable to all years subsequent to 1948, represented
an attempt by Congress to provide tax advantages in common law states
equivalent to those enjoyed by spouses residing in community property
states, without effecting the attendant reallocation of income between mem-
bers of the family unit resulting from community property laws.' 7 This
marriage and paid during marriage in a community property state is considered
community income; hence, even prior to the enactment of § 12(d), spouses in com-
munity property states were permitted to consider half of such income received as
belonging to each spouse. They then filed separate returns, each one reporting half
the income as his own, and, invoking § 107(a), prorating it over the years in which
it had been earned.
14. This suggestion was first promulgated in the cases cited note 11 supra. The
court in the instant case states that § 107(a) does not require income to be taxed in
the year earned, but merely provides a formula for determining the tax on long term
compensation in the year when received and taxable. Instant case at 652. The lower
court goes further and states that ". . . it is the status of the recipient of the income
in the year of receipt, and not his status in prior years, nor the identity of the in-
dividual who has contributed his services that governs the application of section
107(a), as amended in 1942." 108 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Md. 1952). Both courts cite
as authority for their position the cases cited note 11 supra, but the question arose
in a different context in those cases. There the taxpayers had not been connected with
their firms during the years in which the services had been rendered, nor had they
been members of the firms for 36 months at- the time of receiving their shares of the
long term fees. Yet they were permitted to invoke § 107(a) relief, since they were
members of the firm when the income was received. In the Elder Marshall case an
additional problem was suggested by the fact that the taxpayer had been entitled to
varying percentages of partnership profits over the years in which the § 107 (a)
income was being prorated, all of which differed from the percentage of the fee he
actually received. Hence, if he had collected the fee ratably over the period in which
earned, the amounts collected would not have been the same as what he actually
received. The court decided that administrative considerations justified the use of the
percentage applicable in the year of receipt, invoking its dictum that it is his status
in year of receipt which is decisive. For these two purposes in the § 107(a) computa-
tion, the court's dictum is accurate; but different policy considerations are involved
when the question arises as in the instant case, where the attempt is to apply § 12(d)
relief to years in which that section was not in effect. Thus, as to his relationship to
the partnership, taxpayer's status in year of receipt is the determining factor, but not
necessarily as to his marital status.
15. 14 T.C. 90, aff'd, 185 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1950).
16. The amendment was specifically designed to permit partners to take advantage
of the § 107(a) relief, despite the fact that they did not participate in the services for
which the compensation was paid. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 109
(1942).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 et seq. (1948). The legislators
feared and wished to forestall wholesale attempts to change laws of common law
states to obtain community property tax benefits, which might have resulted in sub-
stantial confusion. Id. at 23. Several alternative plans had been suggested to equalize
the income tax liability of all married persons, regardless of jurisdiction, but were
rejected. REVENUE REVIsIoN 1947-48, REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL TAX STUDY CoM-
MITTEE TO THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947) ; Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means
on Community Property and Family Partnerships, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 812, 844, 846,
854 (1948). See BRUTON, CASES ON FEDERAL TAXATION 143-145 (1950 ed.). Spouses
in community property states are also given some tax advantage by § 12(d), in so
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section is merely a method of computing the tax on the combined income
of spouses filing a joint return at a surtax rate lower than that applicable
to the entire combined income of the spouses; it obviously does not alter
the control over the income for any purpose other than the computation of
federal income tax. The instant decision results in granting to married
taxpayers receiving long term income for which services had been rendered
prior to 1948, a tax advantage over similarly situated taxpayers in common
law states who were paid as the services were rendered.' 8 In view of the
legislative policy expressed in § 12(d) to create tax equality between
spouses in community property and common law states,19 the decision seems
appropriate; but the ambiguity as to whether § 12(d) should be applied to
§ 107(a) income earned prior to 1948 could lead to absurd consequences
in other cases,20 and should be clarified by the legislature.
Assuming that § 12(d) relief can be granted to bunched income earned
prior to 1948, a second problem is raised by the method of computation of
the relief to be granted. For those years in which joint returns had been
filed, the method used by the taxpayers and approved by the court seems
most appropriate, since it taxes the aliquot portion of the increment at a
surtax rate which would apply § 12(d) benefits to the § 107(a) income
without granting taxpayers more favorable rates on that income which was
actually received in former years. In prorating the § 107(a) income, in
order to compute the tax on the total increment for a year in which only
far as they are permitted to use a lower surtax bracket in respect to income which
formerly would have been considered separate property for tax purposes. This
strengthens the implication that equality of tax benefits was one of the motivating
factors in the passage of § 12(d), not merely a desire to aid spouses in common law
jurisdictions.
18. A married person in a common law state who had received a fee as services
were rendered would have had to report the entire compensation as his own separate
income, without being able to use lower surtax rates. This would also be true in a
community property state if husband rendered the services prior to his marriage, even
though he was paid for those services after marriage. In community property states
such compensation would be considered separate income, and would be taxable to the
husband as his own. Cf. Wrightsman v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1940)
(received bonus after moving into a community property state) ; French v. French,
17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941) (reserve pay of naval officer) ; New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 Pac. 61 (1923) (proceeds of life
insurance policy).
19. See note 17 supra.
20. For example, it is conceivable that a young member of a partnership, in the
year of his marriage, would receive his share of a fee for long term services rendered
by the partnership over years prior to taxpayer's membership in the partnership.
The services could even have commenced prior to the year of taxpayer's birth. Under
the Elder Marshall case (note 11 spra) it would seem that taxpayer would be entitled
to prorate the income over all those years, even prior to his birth. And the instant
case would by analogy seem to be authority for the position that one-half of such
compensation could be allocated to his wife and prorated over her lifetime, or longer,
even though they were not married in the years during which the services were ren-
dered. Not only would this seem to be more than Congress could ever have intended,
but an interesting problem would arise as to whether taxpayers would be entitled
under such a computation to claim personal exemptions for the years prior to birth.
While the instant decision would not compel this result in other situations, the
tendency of the courts to rely on and approve the dictum in the Elder Marshall, case
(note 11 supra) (it is taxpayer's status in year of receipt which is controlling) could
cloud the true issue of whether such a result falls within the scope of the relief
intended.
RECENT CASES
one spouse had income, they first determined the amount of tax attributable
to one-half of the aliquot portion of § 107(a) increment when added to the
other income of the earning spouse; then doubled the figure thus obtained.
2 1
This imposes a uniform tax on both halves of the prorated portion of the
bunched income at a tax bracket which takes into account the marital
entity's other income for those years, and does not give any advantage
from the fact that one spouse earned no other income. But by allowing
each spouse separately to prorate one-half of the bunched income over
years prior to 1948 in which the spouses had filed separate returns, the
court is permitting the spouse who had the smaller amount of other income
in the earlier years to apply a lower surtax bracket to her share of the in-
crement.P Such a method results in excessive relief, and is as improper
as requiring the husband to treat the entire bunched income as his own,
which deprives them of any relief.P Nor would it be proper to permit
the taxpayers to add together all income of both spouses with the share of
the lump sum compensation allocable to such a year, divide the sum in half,
and double the tax on that amount. This latter method would result in
giving them § 12(d) relief on their other income received prior to 1948, as
well as on the increment 4 For years in which a joint return had been
filed it seems that the most accurate method is the one which applies the
same theory of uniform taxation used in those years; but for years in which
separate returns were filed the mathematical application of the two sec-
tions together. is difficult. On the latter problem several alternatives and
their objections are set forth in the note2 5
21. See computation in note 5 supra.
22. Thus, in the method used by the taxpayers and approved by the court, as
illustrated in note 4 supra, W is permitted to use the surtax rates applicable to $Y
plus $10,000, while H uses the surtax brackets of $X plus $10,000. Assuming $Y is
less than $X, W is getting the advantage of a surtax rate lower than the one which
should be applied to the combined income of the spouses.
23. The latter method is the one used by the Collector in computing the deficiency
for those years. It gives no effect to the fact that taxpayer is married when receiving
the compensation and the policy of § 12(d) to equalize treatment of married tax-
payers regardless of jurisdiction.
24. Using the figures of the illustration in note 4 supra, the spouses had an income
of $X plus $00 in each of the prior years; allocating one-seventh of the bunched
income to each of those years would make a total combined income of $X plus
$20,000. Using a surtax bracket applicable to one-half of the total (as if § 12(d)
were in effect) would enable taxpayers to gain an advantage not only as to the
§ 107(a) income, but also as to their other income ($X). If $X were high enough,
then the tax payable on one-half the total sum, including the allocated § 107 (a)
income, might well come out to less than the amount of tax actually paid in those prior
years. This would mean that not only would there be no additional tax payable on the
$140,000 received in 1948, but that the result might be a reduction of their tax for 1948.
Such a result would be unthinkable without a specific mandate from Congress that
§ 12(d) was to be retroactive to the date of the first income tax in 1916.
25. Using the illustration in note 4 .upra so that W earned $Y in each of the
prior years in question, a figure lower than H's income of $X, at least three methods
of computation are possible. (1) Compute the tax in the same manner as suggested
in note 4 supra, using the income of the spouse who earned the greatest amount (H)
and ignoring entirely the income of the spouse who earned the least (W). But this
means that the increment is taxed at the same rate to a family which earned $X plus
$Y as to a family which earned only $X. (2) Compute the tax applicable to the
combined income of the spouses, including one-half of the allocable share of the
§ 107(a) income ($X plus $Y plus $10,000) ; from this subtract the tax actually paid
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Unless some amendment is made to resolve the ambiguity in the Code,
the relief granted in the instant case may reverse the scales so as to make it
more desirable for single persons to postpone receipt of long term income
until after marriage, and could well lead to tax avoidance schemes imposing
additional burdens on regular income receiving taxpayers.
Urban Redevelopment-
STATUTE AUTHORIZING USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
PROCEEDINGS TO ACQUIRE VACANT LAND UPHELD
Plaintiff brought a quo warranto action to question the existence of a
public use ' in a statute 2 authorizing a municipal authority to take by
eminent domain vacant land which was found to be unmarketable. 3 It was
stipulated that the 40 acres involved, 4 located in Chicago, would provide
critically needed housing and aid in a slum clearance program when de-
veloped by a private corporation with $15,000 homes according to a plan
approved by municipal authorities. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that
the taking was for a public use and therefore a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain. People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 111 N.E.2d 626
(Ill. 1953).
by the two spouses in those years (H paid a tax on $X, and W paid a tax on $Y).
Multiply the result by two to get the tax applicable to the increment received as a
marital entity. This method involves the use of a uniform surtax bracket, but at a
level which would have been used had the spouses filed a joint return in those years;
this is not realistic, since it puts them in a higher surtax bracket than they would
actually have used, and might result in less relief than if H computed the tax on the
increment as if he had earned the entire amount himself without allocating any to W.
(3) Compute the tax applicable to the combined income including one-half of the al-
locable portion of the § 107(a) income ($X plus $Y plus $10,000) ; from this subtract
the tax that the spouses would have paid on their combined income had they filed a
joint return in those years (the tax on $X plus $Y). Multiply this result by two to
get the tax applicable to the increment received by the spouses. This is probably the
most consistent of the three methods, taking advantage of a uniform tax on the entire
increment, but at the same time taking into consideration the entire combined income of
both spouses.
1. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation." ILL. CONST. Art. II, § 13.
2. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 67/, § 64 (Supp. 1952). This 1949 act amended the
1947 Illinois Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 67Y, §§63-91
(Supp. 1952). Ten days after this amendatory act was passed, the Blighted Vacant
Areas Development Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 67Y, §§ 91.1-91.7 (Supp. 1952), was
also enacted, possibly due to fear that the amendatory act would be held violative
of the single subject matter provision of the state constitution. This comment will
not consider that question.
3. Unmarketability is defined as resulting from "... obsolete platting, diversity
of ownership, deterioration of structures or site improvements, or taxes and special
assessment delinquences [sic] usually exceeding the fair value of the land ..
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 673, § 64 (Supp. 1952).
4. The Federal Housing Act of 1949 authorized grants for projects that include
the acquisition of vacant land similar to that authorized by the Illinois act. 63 STAT.
420 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1460 (Supp. 1952).
RECENT CASES
Public use, a requirement for taking by eminent domain, has been the
subject of two definitions: a narrow view of "use by the public," 5 and a
broad view of "public advantage." 8 There is general agreement that a
public use exists in authorizing the taking of slums and blighted areas for
replacement with low cost housing.7 Courts following the broad view have
held that slum clearance is a public use regardless of whether later developed
by public or private capital,8 or whether the land is subsequently used for
commercial purposes. 9 However, in 1952 and 1953 the highest courts of
Florida '0 and Georgia 11 held invalid the taking of slum areas for develop-
ment by private capital for commercial purposes. The instant case is the
first to declare that taking vacant land is a public use; 12 and, in so doing it
materially extends the definition of public use, since the decision requires
neither removal of what is normally considered slum or blight nor replace-
ment by low cost housing.'3 The court said that the taking constituted a
public use because it alleviated a housing shortage, aided slum clearance,
removed hazards to health, safety, welfare, and morals by developing the
area, and eliminated factors impairing sound community growth.' 4
Eminent domain is a major instrument of urban redevelopment in
solving the problem of housing shortages; but, the lack of sufficient housing
is only one of the problems of urban redevelopment, which, in its broadest
sense, ". . . embraces rehabilitation of any sort of blighted area by re-
development for any appropriate uses." 15 Eminent domain, therefore, may
well be applied beyond the limits of precedent and the instant decision by
further expanding the concept of public use. Two criteria for a taking
5. 2 NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 430 (3d ed., Sackman and Van Brunt, 1950)
(cases collected).
6. 2 id. at 433.
7. N.Y.C. Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936); Dornan
v. Phila. Housing Auth., 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atl. 834 (1938). Generally the removal
of the slum constitutes the required public use; but often the courts do not find the
required public use either squarely in the nature of what is removed from the land,
or what is later placed on it, but rather in some indefinable quantity of both factors.
8. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. White, 411 Ill. 310, 104 N.E.2d 236
(1952); Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943); Belovsky v.
Redevelopment Auth., 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947).
9. Ajootian v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 91 A.2d 21 (R.I. 1952) ; Nash-
ville Housing Auth. v. Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951).
10. Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952). See 101 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 411 (1952).
11. Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 74 S.E.2d 891 (Ga. 1953).
12. See State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 110 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio 1953) (upheld taking
of an area that included 3.7% of vacant land).
13. Some authorities maintain that the "public use" that is required for eminent
domain is similar to the "public purpose" that is required to justify exercise of the
spending and taxing power. 2 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 456-457 (3d ed., Sackman
and Van Brunt 1950) ; Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in Eminent Domain, 20
B.U.L. REv. 615, 625 (1940) ; Note, 9 U. OF PiTT. L. REv. 74, 92 (1947). Under that
premise this extension is not so great in Illinois, since that state has held that public
funds spent for vacant land that is to be used for non-low cost housing amounts to a
"public purpose." Cremer v. Peoria Housing Auth., 399 Ill. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948).
14. The public use found here is not placed in either of the two categories referred
to in note 7 supra.
15. Fordham, Urban RedeveloPinent, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 414, 415 (1949).
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for a public use are set up by the instant statute: (1) unmarketability, and
(2) vacant land. The requirement of unmarketability16 is primarily di-
rected at the difficulties of land assembly which have always been a major
reason for the use of eminent domain.'T Vacant land is defined as "pre-
dominantly open." 18 Whether that definition includes all land that lacks
buildings or only land which is not being put to use is a question that will
have to be decided by future Illinois courts. Generally, however, vacant
land has certain distinguishing characteristics. Usually it contains no
homes, and to that extent the taking is even less onerous than in slum
clearance because of the absence of tenants and rentiers. Furthermore,
failure by an owner to use his land often induces unsanitary growth,
swamps, and other unhealthy conditions, as well as immoral and illegal
acts, which raise the cost of police protection for property that makes little
contribution for such expense.' 9 The removal of such conditions by order
of the appropriate "sanitation" officer and zoning under the police powers
is not an adequate remedy because the required removal is no guarantee
that the conditions will not reappear; zoning will only prevent reoccurrence
if the land is put to subsequent use, and even then it will provide only
minimum standards.20 It would seem appropriate, therefore, that such
vacant land, similar in its effect to that of slum and blight, should be sub-
ject to taking by eminent domain when it is unmarketable, regardless of the
use to which the land is to be put (as long as it is a substantial improve-
ment). Under this view a public use would exist in the removal of the
detrimental effect of this land. 2 1 Even if vacant land lacks the above "blight
factors," it should nevertheless be subject to eminent domain if private
enterprise is unable, because of land assembly difficulties, to develop land as
may be required in conjunction with a slum clearance program,2 a shortage
of housing,2 3 or a commercial redevelopment. In this situation a public
use would exist in the use to which the land is subsequently to be put.2 '
16. See note 3 supra.
17. Land assembly includes dealing with holdout owners, title defects and tax
delinquencies. For more on land assembly see Robbins, Problems in Land Assembly
in WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 172 (1938).
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 67Y2, §65(1) (Supp. 1952).
19. See legislative findings in the Blighted Vacant Areas Development Act,
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 67%, § 91.2 (Supp. 1952).
20. The practical limitations on the use of the zoning power due to its emphasis
on proscription of future conditions rather than rehabilitation are increased by the
rigid nature of zoning ordinances. See Note, 52 YALE L.J. 634, 636 (1943).
21. Since low cost housing has generally been required to find a public use, the
validity of a taking for $15,000 homes may well indicate that the public use found
here was in the removal of the detrimental effect of the land in question.
22. Contemplated development of a slum area may be retarded by the developer's
apprehension as to the future effects of neighboring unmarketable vacant land upon
the newly created project.
23. Such a housing shortage which may result from the lack of facilities to house
those made homeless by a slum clearance project, has even been held a necessary
prerequisite to a slum clearance project by the Florida court. Adams v. Housing
Auth., 60 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1952).
24. This analysis has attempted to define the public use in terms either of what
undesirable land factor is removed or to what desired use the land is put. As noted
earlier, see note 7, supra, the courts have not so analyzed the problem. Those courts
which would not find a public use in either element alone may, however, find it in both
elements combined.
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However, if unmarketable vacant land is neither subject to "blight fac-
tors," nor required for the subsequent uses above, the broad view of eminent
domain should be limited to prevent taking such land. Any further
expansion would probably tend toward allowing small scale unintegrated
projects. In such circumstances the mere economic waste would not seem
to warrant a forced taking from unwilling individuals. 25 It would seem,
therefore, that the Illinois statute here in question could be properly ex-
tended even beyond the new and liberal limits of the instant case by
categorizing the required public use according to either the nature of the
land taken or the use to which it is put. The flexible nature of the concept
of public use should continue to serve as an instrument for the courts to
permit future public planning.
25. Public ownership of undeveloped land is considered by one writer at 52 YALE
L.J. 634, 637-8 (1943).
